In an exchange with 'Servant' on the subject of divine omniscience and free will, it occurred to me that the issue of liberty of the will has not been properly aired. So I thought I'd start a thread on it.
Here's the issue: either we can make choices (subject to the constraints of nature) or our actions are determined by an external force.
If the former case, then we are capable of making decisions for ourselves and we are said to have free will -- the ability to choose freely among available alternatives.
I have to state it in this way because we are not free to will anything, but are constrained by our physical givens (I can't choose to flap my arms and float through the air for example). The issue is important when it comes to moral, political, and other choices that matter.
Why is it important? If we have free will, then we are responsible for our choices, and must stand or fall by them. This is moral agency.
On the other hand, if our actions are determined by an external force, then we have no moral agency and are not personally responsible for our actions.
My own philosophical position is a weak determinism; I believe that we have choice but it is constrained not only by physical nature but by our environmental givens (upbringing, social and economic structure, culture) and by our genetics. For example, I cannot choose to be sexually attracted to sea slugs. There may be, for all I know, persons sexually attracted to sea slugs (though it isn't mentioned in Krafft-Ebing), but I cannot be one, not because I have not formulated the volition but because I cannot. It is not possible for me to do this because of constraints that have nothing to do with physical nature nor with mental choice. I simply cannot formulate this choice.
If someone else can formulate a sexual preference for sea slugs, is that a true volition or is it something else that is not volitional? If the latter, is that sexual preference a morally evaluable choice?
Of course, this could be said about other things. I could not bring myself to eat horse, for example, but millions of French people can. There, though, the constraint is cultural. If I choose not to eat horse, am I, in fact, exercising free will?
Here's the issue: either we can make choices (subject to the constraints of nature) or our actions are determined by an external force.
If the former case, then we are capable of making decisions for ourselves and we are said to have free will -- the ability to choose freely among available alternatives.
I have to state it in this way because we are not free to will anything, but are constrained by our physical givens (I can't choose to flap my arms and float through the air for example). The issue is important when it comes to moral, political, and other choices that matter.
Why is it important? If we have free will, then we are responsible for our choices, and must stand or fall by them. This is moral agency.
On the other hand, if our actions are determined by an external force, then we have no moral agency and are not personally responsible for our actions.
My own philosophical position is a weak determinism; I believe that we have choice but it is constrained not only by physical nature but by our environmental givens (upbringing, social and economic structure, culture) and by our genetics. For example, I cannot choose to be sexually attracted to sea slugs. There may be, for all I know, persons sexually attracted to sea slugs (though it isn't mentioned in Krafft-Ebing), but I cannot be one, not because I have not formulated the volition but because I cannot. It is not possible for me to do this because of constraints that have nothing to do with physical nature nor with mental choice. I simply cannot formulate this choice.
If someone else can formulate a sexual preference for sea slugs, is that a true volition or is it something else that is not volitional? If the latter, is that sexual preference a morally evaluable choice?
Of course, this could be said about other things. I could not bring myself to eat horse, for example, but millions of French people can. There, though, the constraint is cultural. If I choose not to eat horse, am I, in fact, exercising free will?
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