Should black ppl wear poppies

[RichD]

dat like da peeps woo quote wiki as facts

Same like the peep who repeat diss

[Tropicana]

Ah come on RichD. You know that Wikipedia is one of your favourite sources.

[RichD]

Ah come on RichD. You know that Wikipedia is one of your favourite sources.

Anybody who claim not to use it is a lyad.

[Tropicana]

Wikipedia is not a reliable source. We have discussed this many times RichD. No need to re-hash. It's use is to be reserved for fluffy content.

[RichD]

Wikipedia is not a reliable source. We have discussed this many times RichD. No need to re-hash. It's use is to be reserved for fluffy content.

It is as reliable as any other source online.


Again anynody who sey dem nuh us it a lyad

[Emperah]

Wiki can be very useful for many tings and very reliable (an nuhbadda guh bring up nuh ols paos from yesteryear needah )
Jus now I am looking for the artists real names as 2nite mi need fill out SOCAN sheets fi de crtc an de ppl real name haffi deh pan it.
What I cyaan fibd pan discogs is usually available at wikileaks

If wiki is so lie and unreliable den wah dem a badda snowden fah?

[Tropicana]

You are mashing up your own thread I will answer you here.

http://www.jamaicans.com/forums/showthread.php?70330-Is-Wikipedia-a-Credible-Source

[Tuff Gong]

Why West Indians should wear Poppies:

[Tuff Gong]

yuh ever hear of Curphey Home?


si a story from last week here:


http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/2...ead/lead6.html

Good story. I was just thinking of Curphey Place the other day.

[Wahalla]

It was good to hear Lord Constantine... ihe was elevated to the house of Lords....

However today there was a obituary in the Daily Telegraph.... please have the patience to read it... at least to the red... Who were these africans what happened to them ??????who returned home.... I fisrt became aware of them in a book on world war II

Major Clive de Paula - obituary

Major Clive de Paula was an SOE officer whose deceptions in Burma fooled the enemy and saved many lives

De Paula on his 1954 military identity certificate









5:34PM GMT 10 Nov 2013
1 Comment


Major Clive de Paula, who has died aged 96, served with SOE in the Second World War and specialised in intelligence and deception operations.

In 1943 de Paula was given the task of forming 12 (East African) Observation unit, a reconnaissance and deception company comprising two British officers and 50 African soldiers. After training in jungle warfare in Ceylon, in 1944 the unit moved to Burma.

They were part of 11th (East African) Division which had been directed to push the Japanese back from the edge of the Imphal plain down the Kabaw Valley in order to establish bridgeheads over the Chindwin River, which was swollen by the monsoon rains.

De Paula’s company duped the Japanese into rushing troops three miles down the river to repel a non-existent crossing attempt; the actual crossing was achieved unopposed. So successful was the diversion operation, which had prevented many casualties, that the commander of the assaulting force sought out de Paula and thanked him.

Frederic Clive de Paula was born at Radlett, Hertfordshire, on November 17 1916, and educated at Rugby and in Spain and France. In 1934 he was articled to a firm of chartered accountants established by his father.

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He enlisted in the TA in 1939 and, in 1940, served as a Liaison Officer with the Free French Forces in London. He was then posted to 19 Military Mission as a cipher officer and attached to the French forces that took part in the Norwegian campaign.
The following year he moved to Brazzaville, Congo, where General de Gaulle had an HQ, as a member of the Military Mission there. He was under the direction of Colonel Peter Fleming, who was in charge of “D” Division and head of military deception operations in South East Asia.
In summer 1941 he was in Cairo. The reality was that the Eighth Army was in no shape to launch an attack on Rommel’s forces before the autumn; de Paula was part of a team which had the job of persuading German Intelligence that an attack was imminent.
In April 1942 he was in Nairobi, helping with reconnaissance for the amphibious attack on Vichy French-controlled Madagascar that took place the following month. This involved briefings and the dissemination of maps which indicated that the real objective was the Italian-occupied Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean.
The garrisons of Kos and Leros were accordingly reinforced. De Paula took part in the assault on Diego Suarez, Madagascar, which achieved complete surprise. He went ashore with the commandos and, as the cipher officer, handled all the messages to and from de Gaulle.
After the gruelling Burma campaign de Paula was sent back to London to recuperate. The war in Europe was over and he worked for the finance division of the Allied Control Commission in Germany. Part of his job was to requisition stocks of fine wine looted from France and held by merchants to supply Nazi leaders.
After demobilisation in 1946 he joined Robson, Morrow, management consultants, and was made a partner in 1951. The following year he delivered the first paper to forecast the imminent impact of computers on accountancy.
In 1967 he was seconded to the Department of Economic Affairs and then the Ministry of Technology, where he subsequently became senior industrial adviser.
He was appointed CBE in 1970 and returned to Robson, Morrow as senior partner.
In 1971 he became managing director of the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation and, in 1980, chairman of Tecalemit. He was chairman of the International Food and Wine Society from 1980 to 1983 and the author of several business and accounting publications.
De Paula was a founder member of 21 SAS Regiment (Artists) Volunteers and served from 1947 to 1956. In retirement he enjoyed fly-fishing, travel and walking.
Clive de Paula married first, in 1950, Pamela Quick. She predeceased him. He married secondly, in 1983, Wendy Hall, who survives him with a stepson from his first marriage.
Major Clive de Paula, born November 17 1916, died October 27 2013

[Wahalla]

Orde Wingate...was gay

This is from Wikipidia which we are told is not reliable.... so a pure lie... nutting nuh guh suh......



Gideon ForcePart 1


The Gideon Force was a small British-led African special force which acted as a Corps d'Elite amongst the irregular Sudan Defence Force and Ethiopian forces fighting the Italian occupation forces in Ethiopia during the East African Campaign of World War II. The leader and creator of the force was Major Orde Wingate.

Contents

Italy occupied parts of Ethiopia in 1936, and eventually created Italian East Africa (covering modern-day Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia). Italian troops in Ethiopia numbered about 250,000, most of them native Eritreans recruited to the Italian army.
When Italian dictator Benito Mussolini declared war against France and Britain in June 1940, Italian forces became a potential threat to British supply routes in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. British troops in Egypt and the Sudan were outnumbered relative to the Italian forces in Ethiopia and Libya. This was put into stark perspective when Italian troops made advances to capture territory on the borders of Kenya and the Sudan in June and July before moving to conquer British Somaliland in August.
Short of men, General Archibald Wavell (the Commander-in-Chief of the British Middle East Command) needed all of the local support he could find. One answer was Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia. The deposed emperor had been living in England ever since the Italians invaded his country in 1936 during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Ethiopian resistance fighters called Arbegnoch ("Patriots") had been fighting the Italians ever since the beginning of the occupation. They would raid Italian forts and communication lines. However, they hardly cooperated at all and the Italians were often able to play one group against another.^{[citation needed]}
In June 1940, Wavell invited Emperor Selassie to Sudan so his supporters could rally around him. The British recruited a bodyguard for him from among the Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum. In July the British government recognized Haile Selassie and promised to help him.
In August 1940, the British set up Mission 101 led by Colonel Daniel Sandford, a close friend and advisor of Haile Selassie and who had encouraged him to return from Britain. The role of Mission 101 was to contact the Arbegnoch and make gifts of money to local leaders who agreed to fight the Italians. It would then organise "Operational Centres" (small groups of officers and NCOs) in Gojjam to provide weapons, training and co-ordination for Arbegnoch attacks. Wavell expected that these irregular forces would be able to tie down large numbers of Italian units throughout the colony, although Lieutenant-General William Platt, Wavell's senior commander in the Sudan did not believe that Hailie Selassie had the support of the majority of the Ethiopian people and was lukewarm towards providing support to the patriot groups.^[1]
At the end of October 1940, because of the increasing Axis threat in the Middle East, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden convened a conference in Khartoum. The importance of defeating the Italian Army in East Africa prior to operations in North Africa became a priority in order to avoid any conflict on two fronts. In attendance were Emperor Selassie, South African General Jan Smuts (who held an advisory brief for the region with Winston Churchill), the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Command, Archibald Wavell and his senior military commanders in East Africa, Lieutenant-General Platt and Lieutenant-General Cunningham. The general plan of attack, including the use of Ethiopian irregular forces, was agreed upon at this conference.^[2] Also agreed was an increased level of support for the Arbegnoch.^[3]
Part of the increased support saw the posting in early November of Major Orde Wingate (who had spent five inter-war years with the Sudan Defence Force and was later to gain fame in Burma with the Chindits) to Khartoum as a staff officer with the brief of liaising between Platt, Mission 101and the Emperor.^[1] Wavell had met Wingate during their service in Palestine and selected him for the job. On 6 November 1940, Wingate arrived in Khartoum.
Beginnings[edit]

Wingate formulated a plan for action in Ethiopia which he presented to Wavell and senior staff in Cairo in early December 1940. The plan included the formation of a small regular force under Wingate to act as a spearhead for military operations in Gojjam. He argued that:

“

To raise a revolt you must send in a Corps d'Elite to do exploits and not just as peddlers of war material and cash ... A thousand resolute and well-armed men can paralyse 10,000

”

His plan was approved by Wavell (in the face of Platt's lack of enthusiasm) and Wingate created his formation from one battalion of Sudanese of the British Sudan Defence Force and one battalion of Ethiopian soldiers of the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion, mostly composed of soldiers that had served in the Ethiopian army as well as some members of the Haganah Force who served with him in Palestine in 1936.^[4] In total, they numbered only 2,000 men and 18,000 camels meant for transport. The camels were under the care of Laurens van der Post who would go on to become a famous author. The explorer and author Wilfred Thesiger was one of the force commanders. Wingate named these soldiers as the Gideon Force, after the biblical figure of Gideon.
Troops of the Gideon Force departed on December 1940 in small columns towards Mount Belaya in Gojjam (the contemporary Metekel Zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region).
Battle begins[edit]

By mid-January 1941 the British had reinforced their troops in the Sudan under Platt to two expanded divisions. They had also built up their forces in Kenya to three divisions under Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham. On 18 and 19 January 1941, the British launched offensives against the Italians: Cunningham's force from Kenya into Italian Somaliland and southern Ethiopia and to the north Platt's divisions from the Sudan into Eritrea. On 20 January, the Emperor, accompanied by Wingate, met Ethiopian soldiers on the border crossing from Sudan into Ethiopia at Um Idla.
Wingate's horse-mounted Sudanese troops reached Mount Belaya in five days, while the Ethiopians with their camel caravan took 2 weeks. Wingate and the emperor arrived at Belaya on 6 February and Haile Selassie established his headquarters there.
Platt's poor opinion of Hailie Selassie, Sandford and Wingate, meant that he paid little attention to Mission 101 and the resulting lack of clear areas of responsibility and chains of command (together with Wingate's naturally abrasive manner) meant that for the whole campaign there was friction and animosity between Wingate and the other commanders.^[5] On Wingate's arrival at Belaya there followed a period of considerable tension between Wingate and Sandford because the latter assumed he was in overall command. On 12 February they were both summoned to Khartoum where Platt attempted to resolve the issue by confirming Wingate's appointment to command Gideon Force and making him an acting Colonel. Sandford was very upset but was then summoned to Cairo, congratulated on his work and appointed Brigadier, leaving the overall issue unresolved.^[6]
On 18 February Gideon Force started crossing over the escarpment into the eastern part of Gojjam. Aided by Arbegnoch fighters, they attacked the Italian forts, garrisons and patrols. Also due to the advance of Cunningham's forces in Somalia, the Italians withdrew eastward from their positions.
On 24 February, Wingate led Gideon Force to surround the Italian fort at Bure. Some of the Ethiopian force got lost and a grass fire hindered them, but they met with no Italian resistance. Wingate tried to give an impression of a larger force to intimidate the Italians; he spread the men wide and again, accompanied by the Arbegnoch, began to ambush the Italians. Wingate led some groups himself.
At the same time, Selassie approached the area. Formerly neutral or pro-Italian local rulers turned to support him. Ethiopian irregulars attached to Italian units, known as banda, began to desert to the Emperor's side.
The numerically superior Italians retreated to the southeast on 4 March. The British command in Khartoum, which had cracked the Italian codes, informed Wingate of the move. He ordered a Sudanese unit to block and ambush the Italians, but the commander of the unit failed to do so. Disappointed, Wingate ordered a pursuit and his men made small harassing attacks against the Italians. The Italians pushed through a small Ethiopian force near Dembecha on the Chakara River with 325 casualties (Ethiopian casualties were only 48). The Italian commander of Dembecha also retreated to the east against his orders and Gideon Force occupied Dembecha on 8 March.

[Wahalla]

Incidentally.... I ended up working with the General Cunnigham great grand son.... and the grand son of one the men on this campaign who turned into HIM pilot.....

Part 2
Debre Marqos[edit]

The next target of the combined British force was a fort near Debre Marqos. This time, the Italians counterattacked and fierce fighting ensued. Gideon Force retreated and began hit-and-run attacks and raids to drain Italian strength. Italian losses amounted to 200 over the next weeks. Their intention to evacuate was blocked by the Arbegnoch.
A couple of days after the Italians had left Debra Marqos, Haile Selassie entered the city on 6 April. At the same time, British regular forces entered Addis Ababa.
Other Italian forces retreating to the east and over the Blue Nile were continuously harassed by the Arbegnoch and Gideon Force. However, some Arbegnoch began looting in the retaken areas and Gideon Force had to restore order.
When most of Gideon Force were ordered to Addis Ababa (which had been occupied by Cunningham's troops on 6 April), a smaller force (Safforce) under Mission 101 pursued retreating Italians to the north towards Debre Sina. While this was going on, on 5 May, Emperor Selassie made his formal entry into Addis Ababa with a victory march in which most of Gideon Force were required to provide his escort. After the ceremonies Wingate returned to Safforce.
Last battles[edit]

Shortly after his return, Wingate received an order from Cunningham to stop the pursuit of retreating Italians and help other British forces elsewhere. He pretended that he could not decipher the message and continued on his course. The other part of the Gideon Force, led by the explorerWilfred Thesiger, crossed to the north of the Debra Sinai plateau and attacked from the north. On 18 May, the Italians found themselves blocked from the north and south. Thinking he faced superior numbers, the Italian commander agreed to surrender on 24 May.
The Gideon Force was officially disbanded on 1 June 1941. Wingate returned to Egypt. Many of the troops from the Gideon Force were transferred to North Africa and attached to the 8th Army Long Range Desert Group LRDG. The last Italian troops surrendered in Begemder province in the north to British and Arbegnoch forces.
Aftermath[edit]

With the surrender of the Italians, the British, under pressure from the US administration, signed an agreement acknowledging Ethiopian sovereignty in January 1942.
Wingate came down with malaria and was sent back to Britain by troop ship, much to the relief of the general staff in Cairo who had feared that he would get involved in the post war politics of Ethiopia. They also ignored Wingate's request for decorations for his men and obstructed his attempts to get back-pay for his force.
While still in Cairo, out of frustration, Wingate had written a report for Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, in which he outlined the successes of the campaign and his views on future actions of a similar type. He wrote, in part:

To sum up it is proposed to assemble and employ a force of the highest fighting qualities capable of employment in widely separated columns...that it should be allocated an objective behind the enemy's lines, the gaining of which will decisively affect the campaign; and that to enable it to carry out its task it must be given a political doctrine consonant with our war aims.

His report impressed the Secretary of State for India, Leopold Amery, who persuaded Wingate to remove the recriminations in the paper, and then passed it to the War Cabinet and Winston Churchill. He also notified Wavell who was now Commander-in-Chief, India that Wingate had been declared medically fit. In February 1942, Wingate left London for Burma at the request of India Command. It was there that Wingate further developed his ideas and put them into practice when he formed the Chindits.
See also[edit]

• East African Campaign (World War II)
• Order of Battle, East African Campaign (World War II)

[Wahalla]

again... because all this is in Brevour WWIi but I cant copy it....and u have to search so the "unreliable wikipedia"....Y we should wear poppies.... Note the Nigerian divisons have special forces detachment....they were part of the Chindits.. led by the afore mention chi chi man Orde Wingate....

General Officer Commanding : Major General Frederick Joseph Loftus-Tottenham
5 (West Africa) Infantry Brigade5th Bn. The Gold Coast Regiment7th Bn. The Gold Coast Regiment8th Bn. The Gold Coast Regiment5th Light Battery, West African Artillery3rd Field Company, West African Engineers6 (West Africa) Infantry Brigade1st Bn. The Gambia Regiment1st Bn. The Sierra Leone Regiment4th Bn. The Nigeria Regiment3rd Light Battery WAA6th Field Company WAEDivisional Units11th (East Africa) Division Scouts81st (West Africa) Infantry Division Regiment1st Light Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Tank Regiment WAA8th Field Park Company WAE3 (West Africa) Infantry Brigade (detached to Special Force)
6th Bn. The Nigeria Regiment7th Bn. The Nigeria Regiment12th Bn. The Nigeria Regiment

[Wahalla]

But then we know that a pure lie that Wikipedia summarises.. and wahalla cnt remember teh name of the book he read that drew his knowledge of these events at one time when I was obbessed with comando comics I also read history ... after all nothing wahalla says is relaible....

But once more I draw attention to a battle of WWII... while Spike Lee will do a film on triumphs and miracles .. it is never quite that simple.....

Note the name Graziani....The Butcher of Fezzan

Part 1 the battle of Garafanana


The battle[edit]

The Gothic Line, in red. Garfagnana was in the most western section, next to Lucca and Massa

On 21 December 1944, Marshal Graziani and general Carloni visited the battalions of the Monte Rosa Division in the Garfagnana, in order to prepare the offensive.^[5] Following the Ardennes Offensive in mid-December, Allied intelligence had considered the possibility of a similar Axis operation in Northern Italy. They had determined that the most likely objective would be the western coastal sector and as a consequence, the 19th and 21st Brigades of the Indian 8th Infantry Division were ordered from the central Apennine sector to reinforce the US 92nd Infantry Division on the 5th Army's left flank in front of Lucca.^[6][7] 19th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived on 26 December and were ordered by Willis Crittenberger, commander of United States IV Corps, to take up position some 4 miles (6.4 km) behind the 92nd Division's positions. Indian 21st Brigade arrived two days later.^[8] As further insurance, Lucian Truscott, U.S. Fifth Army's commander, placed two infantry regiments from 85th U.S. Infantry Division under Crittenberger's command and moved additional artillery into range.^[9]
On 26 December, several RSI military units, including four battalions of the 4th Italian "Monte Rosa" Alpine Division and the 3rd Italian "San Marco" Marine Division, participated in "Operation Winter Storm" (Wintergewitter) together with three German battalions.
This was a combined German and Italian offensive against the American 92nd Infantry Division. A total of 9,100 Axis troops (of which 66% were Italians), with 100 artillery pieces but no tanks, attacked 18,000 Allied troops which were equipped with 140 artillery batteries and 120 tanks, as well as support from 160 P-47 Thunderbolts of the Allied XXII Tactical Air Command. The surprise factor was fundamental in the attack, together with a cloudy winter front that was hoped to prevent the Allied aircraft from flying. XXII TAC P-47s were in the air throughout the day on the 26th, but continued to fly scheduled missions in Northeastern Italy until the severity of the breakthrough was known. XXII TAC retasked all missions on the 27th to support the 5th Army front and these were key in dislodging the Axis thrust.^{[note 1]}
The attack against the Buffalo soldiers (nickname of the 92nd US Division commanded by Major General Edward Almond) was made in three columns: two by Italians and one by Germans. While German General Fretter-Pico would be the overall commander, Italian General Carloni would lead the attack operationally. All the offensive was under leadership of Italian Marshall Rodolfo Graziani, who promoted the attack with Mussolini.^{[citation needed]}
Their objective: conquest the small towns of Barga, Sommocolonia, Vergemoli, Treppignana, Coreglia, Fornaci di Barga, Promiana, Castelvecchio and Calomini located north-west of Lucca.^[10]
The Order of Battle was:^[11][12]

• First column (toward Vergemoli-Calomini): Italian Alpini Intra battalion; HQ defence company of 1st Reggimento Alpini; Divisional Reconnaissance group (Monterosa Div.); Two battalion, 6th Marine Infantry Regiment (San Marco Division);
• Second column (toward Treppignana-Castelvecchio): Italian Alpini Brescia Battalion ; 1st and 2nd battalions of 286th German Grenadier Regiment;
• Third column (toward Sommocolonia-Barga): German Mountain battalion Mittenwald; Groups of Kesserling battalion.

Early on 26 December elements of the two German assault battalions from the third column attacked the Sommocolonia garrisoned by elements of F Company, 2nd Battalion, 366th Regiment, supported by some partisans.^[13] Some authors state that the resistance there was tough but quickly overwhelmed.^{[citation needed]} In the morning, 200 men of the Mittenwald battalion seized the American positions south of Sommocolonia at Bebbio and Scarpello held by the 92nd Recon Troop, which withdrew to Coreglia. In the meantime, Axis mortars had opened fire along the whole front and the other two columns had started moving forward: the two German grenadier battalions together with the attached company of the Italian Brescia Alpine battalion attacked successfully in the center down the Serchio valley, east of the river. West of the river, the other Brescia companies overcame a weak initial resistance, but their opponents were already falling back and the attackers advanced to Fornaci almost without opposition. Fornaci itself fell quickly, although the two German battalions were heavily criticized for their sluggishness and lack of aggressiveness.^[13] The first column, however, faced more vigorous opposition on the right of the front. The elements of the San Marco division easily seized the village of Molazzano and pushed the defenders back, but the Regimental Headquarters Company suffered losses and could not take the village of Brucciano. The Cadelo Group (of the Monte Rosa Division), supported by the Intra battalion which made small diversionary attacks, occupied Calomini, but the Vergemoli garrison (370th Infantry Regiment and some partisan groups) could not be dislodged. Under threat of encirclement and being cut off it eventually withdrew leaving in place a partisan group as a covering party.^[13]
By 27 December the mini-offensive was over. In the morning, the German assault troops entered Pian di Coreglia, their final objective and Italian patrols went forward as far as the village of Calavorno, reporting that the enemy still was in full retreat. The other columns had also reached their objective points, and an entire Allied Division had been routed.^[13]}}

Buffalo Soldiers of the 92nd Division fighting near Massa, in Garfagnana area

The next morning, the Axis columns occupied Piano di Coreglia, the main objective, and some Italian patrols went forward reporting that the enemy still was in full retreat: an entire Allied division had been defeated. Over 250 prisoners were captured with many weapons, food and equipment.^[14] Italian historian Pellegrinetti wrote that the Italian troops conquered all the villages of the valley up to the outskirts of Bagni di Lucca:^[15] on December 27 late afternoon the main offensive ended, even if the next day there were small territorial consolidations. It had been a success with a penetration of more than 25 kilometres inside the Allies lines.
As troops of the 92nd Division streamed back, they were ordered to take up positions on the left flank of the Indian positions. All Allied troops forming the defence were placed under command of Dudley Russell, commander of the 8th Indian Infantry Division. However, the Axis objectives were short of the Indian line and so the Axis attack was not pressed forward. By late afternoon on December 27, all objectives having been attained, the offensive ended and by the following day the Axis troops were pulling back towards their start lines.^[8]
On 29 December the Indian Division's reconnaissance regiment pushed north up the main road making no contact with the withdrawing troops and by 30 December the front line had been restored more or less to the pre-battle position. On 8 January the Indian troops were withdrawn into reserve^[16] The Alpini of the Monte Rosa Division maintained their new advanced line, 2 kilometres south of the positions they had on December 25, until March 1945.

[Wahalla]

http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/cbtchron/cc/092id.htm

what happened to the AA captured ???????????

The yanki version... of the battle of Garafana

The 370th RCT, attached to the 1st Armored Division, arrived in Naples, Italy, 1 August 1944 and entered combat on the 24th. It participated in the crossing of the Arno River, the occupation of Lucca and the pentration of the Gothic Line. Enemy resistance was negligible in its area. As Task Force 92, elements of the 92d attacked on the Ligurian coastal flank toward Massa, 5 October. By the 12th, the slight gains achieved were lost to counterattacks. On 13 October, the remainder of the Division concentrated for patrol activities. Elements of the 92d moved to the Serchio sector, 3 November 1944, and advanced in the Serchio River Valley against light resistance, but the attempt to capture Castelnuovo did not succeed. Patrol activities continued until 26 December when the enemy attacked, forcing units of the 92d to withdraw. The attack ended on 28 December. Aside from patrols and reconnaissance, units of the 92d attacked in the Serchio sector, 5-8 February 1945, but enemy counterattacks nullified Division advances. On 1 April, the 370th Regiment and the attached 442d Infantry Regiment (Nisei) attacked in the Ligurian coastal sector and drove rapidly north against light opposition. The 370th took over the Serchio sector and pursued a retreating enemy from 18 April until the collapse of enemy forces, 29 April 1945. Elements of the 92d Division entered La Spezia and Genoa on the 27th and took over selected towns along the Ligurian coast until the enemy surrendered, 2 May 1945